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STUDY PROJECT

OTHER THAN WAR MISSIONS: WHAT ROLE SHOULD THEY PLAY IN TOMORROW'S ARMY?

BY

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The probability of, and demand for using the military to execute other than war missions, is increasing dramatically. These missions use the skills, capabilities, and resources of the military, but do not require the use of offensive force in their execution. They include theater of operations actions such as humanitarian and nation assistance, and domestic actions in response to natural disasters, and civil disturbance. The most recent addition to possible missions is support to communities to solve domestic infrastructure problems. There is significant debate in the military, government, and public sectors concerning the appropriateness of diverting military effort to other than war missions. This question is a particular concern as the nation downsizes its military. This paper addresses these missions, their impact on the readiness of the force, and their impact on force structure. It argues that there are valid other than war missions for the military and that assignment of the right unit to the right mission can benefit both the supported area/agency and the military unit executing the mission.

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INTRODUCTION

The leadership of the United States armed forces currently face some of the greatest challenges ever presented to the defense community of this nation. The world has changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War. Not only are the former Soviet Republics establishing themselves as independent states, the rest of the world is enjoying relief from the pressures of two superpowers challenging each other in every corner of the globe. Nations, both developed and developing, are enjoying, and in many cases just realizing their sovereignty. All are reevaluating their position in their region and the world. The United States, as much as any nation, is evaluating the role it will play in this "new world order".

Nearly everyone would agree that the world is not suddenly at peace. Most realize that significant uncertainties still exist concerning stability and security of U.S. interests in many regions. We are, however, moving rapidly toward a significantly downsized military structure by 1995, with the very real prospect of even more force reductions by the Clinton Administration. There is a national turn inward to address the domestic ills of the country. Most citizens and politicians expect to realize a significant peace dividend which can be invested in the economy. The challenge of military leaders in this process is to retain a combat ready force; a force fully capable of executing the National Military Strategy. Their focus must be, "a Total Force trained and ready to fight a strategic force capable of decisive victory."¹ Regardless of the politics of sizing, mixing the force, and establishing the budget, they will be expected to perform. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan, said it best in a speech to the 1993 Army War College class: "WIN! Deal with the constraints and win! That's what the country expects of its senior military leaders

and its armed forces."²

Restructuring the Army to meet the challenges of the world which require the use of warfighting capability is difficult, but it is only part of the problem facing today's leaders. "Other than war" missions are becoming increasingly important and probable. These are missions which use the skills, capabilities, and resources of the military, but do not require the use of offensive force in their execution. Examples are nation assistance, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance.

The world situation is presenting more and more opportunities and requirements for using military capabilities in other than war roles. Humanitarian assistance to Somalia and medical support to UN forces on the ground in Bosnia are just the current efforts in a long history and expanding future of such missions. Traditional military support to domestic civil agencies continues to be a requirement, and the Congress and many other civilian leaders are calling for increased use of the military in solving the domestic problems of the country.

This increasing world and domestic demand for other than war missions complicates the downsizing process. First of all, the military is not sure how to treat these missions, particularly those involving domestic support. Secondly, our military forces are structured for war fighting, not other than war missions. We're looking at a smaller force, which will have a significantly higher percentage of missions which it is not designed to execute.

This paper will examine the Army's other than war missions. It will look at the question of whether the military should be engaged in them, and if so, which ones. I will also look at the influence other than war missions should have on the size and composition of tomorrow's Army. The paper will address only the Army, but the same basic principles

and recommendations apply to all services.

READINESS

Although the United States would like to turn all its interests inward and concentrate solely on getting its domestic house in order, we realize that we will not have that luxury. As the only clear super power; politically, militarily, and economically, the world looks to us for leadership. Our interests, as outlined in the January 1993 National Security Strategy of the United States, remain global.³ Even though we have seen the end of the Cold War, the world environment and our role in it, demand that we stay engaged.

At the end of every other war in our history we have pared our forces back and applied defense dollars elsewhere. The lesson we have learned repeatedly, however, is that this results in a "hollow force" which is unprepared when called upon to meet the Nation's security needs. We have paid for this lack of readiness with the blood of soldiers. Today's senior leadership has sworn not to let this happen again. As General Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, puts it, "we will have no more Task Force Smith's", a reference to the destruction of the first forces to face the North Koreans in 1950.

Readiness of the force must be our first priority. It is important, however, that this issue be separated from the issue of other than war missions; their appropriateness and their impact on force structure.

The readiness concern of General Sullivan and other leaders focuses on the ability of our combat forces to respond, engage in a warfighting mission, and do so quickly, effectively and with minimal loss of life. Following every war in this century we have dismantled

our military forces quickly, stopped procurement of new systems, dramatically under-funded adequate training and left a force structure in peace which had numerous flags, but only hollow units. Units with low assigned versus authorized strengths, inability to train due to personnel and equipment shortages, and a lack of emphasis on readiness, left us unprepared to fight when called upon by the nation. This unpreparedness was predominantly a problem of resourcing and execution.

The issue of other than war missions, on the other hand, is one of proper use of military power to meet national goals and objectives. If these are appropriate missions, they will demand resourcing and professional execution in accordance with priorities and resource constraints. Just doing these missions, however, must not be confused with creating Task Force Smiths.

OTHER THAN WAR MISSIONS

There is no doubt that the primary purpose for maintaining an Army is, "to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential enemy."⁴ Other than war missions, however, have long been a part of the Army's responsibilities. Field Manual 100-1, The Army, specifies that the Army will have a role in peacetime engagement; missions characterized by the benign use of military force. This includes missions such as search and rescue, support to civil authorities, disaster relief, assistance to civilian police forces, and flood control.⁵ Historically the Army has played a major role in these type emergency missions. Examples are endless. They include: fires in Chicago (1871) and Seattle (1889), medical epidemic in the lower Mississippi valley (1878),

drought in Oklahoma (1890), the San Francisco earthquake (1906), explosion of a French freighter in Texas (1947), volcanic eruption in Hawaii (1955), numerous hurricanes such as Andrew and Iniki (1992), Whiskey Rebellion riots (1794), race riots (1919, 1968, 1992), forest fires (1988-92), and refugee operations (1975, 1980, 1991).⁶ Additionally, Army units work continually with local and federal agencies to interdict drug traffic along our borders.

Other than war missions, however, encompass far more than these domestic examples. The Army has also been used frequently and effectively overseas to conduct disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, noncombatant evacuation, and other such missions. Recent examples include: meningitis vaccination campaign in Cameroon (1991), construction and operation of refugee camps and feeding of Kurds in Iraq (PROVIDE COMFORT, 1991), delivery of relief supplies to states in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states, including Russia (PROVIDE HOPE I-III, 1991-92), medical support to peacekeepers in Bosnia, on-going infrastructure construction in Honduras, and delivery of relief supplies to Somalia, Ethiopia, and Yugoslavia. We have provided medical support, road and school construction, disaster assistance, transportation and many other similar kinds of support to nearly 100 nations around the world over the past eight years.⁷ Today we have Army forces engaged in the United States and its territories, Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Honduras, and over 70 other locations, effectively executing other than war missions in support of U.S. interests, goals, and objectives.⁸

There are also some truly new proposals for the use of Army forces. Senator Sam Nunn's ideas to have soldiers serve as role models in public programs, to use military units

to run Youth Corps programs in local communities, to conduct job training programs, and to conduct public health and nutrition outreach programs⁹ push the envelope of possibility. Some of his proposals are similar to Army efforts in the 1930s, during the nation's recovery from the great depression.¹⁰ Some have been tried on small scales recently by National Guard units.¹¹ For the most part, however, they are truly "new" ways to employ the Army.

The term "other than war" mission obviously includes a broad spectrum of possibilities. There are many arguments for and against the Army's execution of these missions.

PRESSURE TO ACCEPT "NEW MISSIONS"

There is a loud call for refocusing the Army to accomplish "non-traditional" domestic missions. This effort is led by Senator Sam Nunn, Chief of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Others call for increased emphasis on missions such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, which, although frequently called "new", are missions the Army has long supported.

President Bush established the environment for a change in the United States armed forces in his Aspen Colorado policy speech of 2 August 1990. "What we need [now] are not merely reductions - but restructuring."¹² Since that speech numerous senior leaders, both civilian and military, have made proposals for restructuring the force.

Senator Nunn is a vocal, and influential, proponent for relooking the structure of the military. He has called for a total reevaluation of the roles and missions of all the services. Additionally, he has initiated action within the Senate which would dramatically alter the

utilization of U.S. military forces.

The opportunity exists, says Senator Nunn, "to use military assets to assist civilian efforts in critical domestic needs.....Our society faces numerous domestic challenges that in many respects are as daunting as any potential foreign threat to our national security."¹³ He, therefore, proposed the establishment of a Civil-Military Cooperative Action Program which would use military force to help meet domestic needs ranging from rehabilitation and removal of community facilities, public health, and drug reduction outreach, to serving as role models and conducting training for disadvantaged youth. Nunn points out that his proposals capitalize on a highly respected and talented military. "The American taxpayers have invested in and have built a great stockpile of innovative ideas, knowledgeable, trained, talented people, and equipment in the military over the years," he says, and "[the military] can make a useful contribution to addressing the problems we face in blighted urban areas, in neglected rural regions, in schools, and elsewhere."¹⁴ Senator Nunn does not propose these initiatives at the expense of the military's other missions. He emphasizes that we must keep our focus on the military mission, first and foremost.

There are other calls for the military to take over humanitarian relief efforts such as the Federal response to assist victims of Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki in 1992. Analysts have speculated that these operations will become an increasingly important part of the military's mission.¹⁵ In addressing Congress in September 1992, Senator Nunn acknowledged the valuable role of the military in disaster relief and indicated that serious consideration be given to transferring responsibility for these missions to the Department of Defense.¹⁶

Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggests that humanitarian missions, such as Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq in 1991 and refugee care for Haitians at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in 1991/92, are "a precursor of what we can look forward to in the next decade if not the next century."¹⁷

Much of this increased interest in use of the Army to accomplish other than war missions focuses on utility. The American people want to know they are getting a worthwhile return on their investment; particularly at a time when the deficit is extremely large and multiple domestic issues are at the forefront of the public mind and the administration's agenda. Americans want a return which is visible and quantifiable. A vague "the nation is secure" at a time when the average citizen sees a world generally at peace, with no major enemies to the United States, will not do. As Representative [now Secretary of Defense] Les Aspin asked recently, "Are the American people willing to pay \$250 billion or even \$200 billion a year for a military that is not very useful? It may be that to maintain a military for the extreme contingencies, it will be necessary to show that it is useful in lesser contingencies, too."¹⁸

A group of senior leaders, which is just as vocal, express the opinion that the Army will lose its warfighting spirit if it engages in these "non-warfighting" operations.

WARNINGS AGAINST GOING "SOFT"

Just as there are numerous proponents for a military which engages in more other than war missions, there are many who warn not to take on these "non-traditional", "soft" functions. They express concern that a shift toward missions such as humanitarian assis-

tance, support to civil authorities, and peacekeeping will "destroy the military's fighting spirit"¹⁹

Mr. Seth Cropsey, former Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy, argues that the U.S. must maintain "armed forces whose mission is single mindedly traditional" if it expects to act decisively in response to regional threats to U.S. interests. He warns, "...humanitarian tasks are likely to confuse the military about its first responsibility.... nothing good will come of a military as bewildered about its purpose as the nation it is supposed to defend."²⁰ He goes on to relate that senior military leaders, active and retired, who attended a panel he moderated in December 1992 entitled, "Military Support of Civil Authorities at Home and Abroad," were clearly reconsidering the purpose of America's military forces. He claims these "soft missions" "...suddenly appear as cash cows to officers who are anxious about budget cuts.....an all-too-familiar Washington bargain, motivated by pork-barrel politics more than the national need."²¹

Senior officers and defense officials also argue passionately that "time spent on community service is time not spent training for war," or "it would detract from the primary mission of going to war," and be "an extremely expensive way to handle domestic problems." Former Army Secretary Howard "Bo" Callaway cautions that "it must be really clearly understood that the Army's primary job is defending the United States."²²

T.R. Fehrenbach's analysis of the Korean War in his book, This Kind of War, provides lessons derived from our total unpreparedness at the start of that war. He supports the need for civilian control of the military, but warns that society must "quit demanding from [the military] impossible acquiescence in the liberal view toward life. A modern

infantry.....must be iron-hard, poised for instant obedience, and prepared to die in the mud."²³

The most dramatic argument against using the military for other than war missions is Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dunlap's recent essay, The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012. He portrays a military reoriented toward peacetime operations. This reorientation undermines civilian control of the military, the foundation of the civil-military relationship. "When the military wasobligated to engage in a bewildering array of nontraditional duties to further justify its existence, it is little wonder that its traditional apolitical professionalism eventually eroded."²⁴ The result was a military coup. A bold warning and challenge to all leaders, military and civilian.

Senior Army and Department of Defense leaders speaking to the U.S. Army War College class of 1993 have emphasized that warfighting is what we must structure for; to do otherwise, they intimate, would be less than professional. There is a distinct reluctance to acknowledge that there may be valid missions for the Army other than those which involve only warfighting. This may be driven purely by professional conviction or from a reluctance to change the status quo.

MISSION ANALYSIS

Just because a mission is traditional, or looks like something the Army could do effectively, doesn't necessarily mean it is something the Army should be doing.

The military is recognized today as one of the most respected organizations and institutions in the nation. This is a reflection of the discipline, professional competence,

pride, high standards, and readiness the services have worked so hard to build. The military has demonstrated an exceptional preparedness for quickly responding to challenges to the nation's security and for successfully executing missions, even under the close scrutiny of CNN and the American public. Leaders and junior soldiers have demonstrated maturity, keen understanding of their role in the nation's operations, and confidence in their abilities.

We need to ask two questions. Do we assign the Army other than war missions simply because it has done them historically and has a demonstrated ability to successfully execute them in a timely, professional manner? Or, do these domestic support and peacetime engagement operations support the national security strategy and sustain the readiness of the force to accomplish its primary warfighting mission? If the answer to the first question is yes, it should place these missions in considerable question as we cut the defense budget and downsize the Army. If the answer to the second question is yes, however, we need to seriously evaluate how we are structured for these missions.

Other than war missions fall into three categories: domestic support, forward presence, and "futuristic" domestic support. I will evaluate each mission category, followed by a discussion of criteria for selecting appropriate missions and the impact of attitude of mission execution.

Domestic Support

Let's look at the common missions in support of civil authorities. The Army is directed to provide the following:²⁵

- * Support public health: rescue, evacuation & emergency medical treatment

- * Emergency restoration of public services: firefighting, water, communications, transportation, power, and fuel
- * Recovery, identification, registration and disposal of dead
- * Monitoring and decontaminating radiological, chemical and biological effects and controlling contaminated areas
- * Roadway movement control
- * Safeguarding, collecting and distributing essential supplies
- * Damage assessment
- * Interim emergency communications
- * Facilitate reestablishment of civil government functions
- * Search and rescue operations
- * Protection of public officials and property
- * Drug interdiction

The first observation which should be made concerning these missions is that few, if any, use the primary combat skills of infantry, armor or artillery soldiers and units. We frequently, however, see combat units assigned to these domestic support missions. The most recent example being Hurricane Andrew relief operations which employed a combat brigade of the 10th Mountain Division. Infantry soldiers were used as labor forces in support of engineer squads.²⁶ This is the kind of situation which opponents of other than war missions point to and rightfully claim that the missions detract from combat readiness and degrade the warrior spirit. In such cases, we are guilty of using the wrong type unit to do the job.

An evaluation of the missions reveals, however, that they can provide a significant contribution to readiness of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units and soldiers. This is in addition to supporting national security; sustaining a strong, secure national base from which to project political and economic as well as military power; and meeting critical domestic emergency needs. The benefits to civil authorities are obvious.

The following benefits accrue to soldiers, units and the Army:

- All of these missions require the use of individual and collective skills which correlate directly to the mission essential task list (METL) of some Army unit. METL proficiency being the criteria to which units train.²⁷
- These missions are done only on an emergency basis. Response to these emergencies exercises and tests the same readiness skills required for response to combat missions or rapid deployments.
- Planning and execution of these missions demands the same skills of mission analysis, coordination of assets and synchronization with agencies and other units as are required of commanders and staffs in combat.
- The stress inherent in some of these missions can be every bit as great as that experienced in a combat situation. Stress is created by the emergency environment, long demanding hours with little sleep, death and serious injuries to civilians of all ages, potential of death or serious injury, darkness, wet/cold conditions, a civilian populous demanding help, etc.²⁸
- Decentralized execution requires junior leaders to exercise judgement in critical situations which are emotional, potentially life threatening to him, his unit and civilians, and are charged with multiple stresses such as time and public scrutiny. These are the same skills he needs to develop in order to succeed in a combat situation.

I have described these benefits as if they are automatic and inherent in these other than war missions. They are not. The potential is clearly there, but benefit achieved

depends first upon assigning the right unit to the mission, and secondly upon the attitude of the leaders toward the mission. Only good leadership can maximize the return on a mission.

Forward Presence Missions

The second major category of other than war mission is those which are accomplished outside the United States and its territories. Examples of these missions are construction of roads and infrastructure in Honduras, South America and Pacific nations, assistance to developing nations with medical epidemic and/or nutritional problems, logistics support to move food supplies to starving natives in Mali, and relief to victims of flooding in Bangladesh. These other than war missions executed outside the United States and its territories fall into the category of forward presence operations. They effectively use Army forces to meet national goals and objectives. These again are not new missions. They have traditionally been a part of the exercise of military power in support of national goals and interests around the world. Today they have much more visibility since the focal point of super power confrontation is gone. Many more opportunities exist to use military forces to assist struggling nations in both emergency and everyday development situations.²⁹

Missions such as humanitarian assistance, medical, logistics and engineering operations, peacetime psyops, and other such operations provide multiple benefits.

- Combat readiness is enhanced in the same manner as it is in executing domestic other than war missions. METL skills are exercised, planning skills are honed, stress is present and tests soldiers during emergency operations, and in many cases small unit leaders are in charge of these operations, thereby improving leadership skills.

- Support is provided to allies. Missions demonstrate national commitment, lend credibility to alliances, strengthen the nation or region supported, and support stability.
- U.S. influence in the supported nation and the region is enhanced. The United States is seen as a positive, productive influence, since most of these missions are conducted at low levels, with little fanfare and publicity, and a major effort is made to retain the prestige and control of the nation supported.
- Execution of these missions provides the theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC) the opportunity to enhance theater plans. Information needed in the development of plans may be gathered. Infrastructure development which will support campaign plans may be accomplished.
- An intelligence base on the area and the specifics of operating there can be developed and maintained. Impacts of weather, terrain, transportation network, population, etc. on operations can be determined/updated.
- A pool of soldiers and units with experience in operating at critical locations throughout the theater is developed and sustained.
- Many of these operations are funded, or partially funded, by the host nation or agencies other than the Department of Defense.

As the U.S. reduces forward stationing of forces, forward presence becomes more important as a means of maintaining U.S. influence in areas of interest. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stresses the importance of forward presence to CINCs. In the Joint

Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) he emphasizes enhancing war plans, and improving and sustaining force readiness by effectively using all types of forward presence operations. The goals of these forward presence operations are:

- Show National Commitment
- Lend Credibility to Our Alliances
- Enhance Regional Stability
- Shape Events in Our Best Interest
- Provide a Crisis Response Capability³⁰

Although Forward Presence appeared as an element of our National Security Strategy in 1991³¹, the Fiscal Year (FY) 1993 JSCP was the first to place emphasis on the multiple benefits of these operations. This new effort to maximize return from these operations is a direct reflection on the increasing probability of, and opportunity for, executing these operations, as well as the need to get a bigger return on limited resources.³²

"Futuristic" Domestic Support Missions

Success in traditional other than war missions, and recent combat missions, combined with demonstrated ability and confidence, naturally result in a desire to use the military to solve other troublesome domestic problems. Evaluation of "new" missions, such as Senator Nunn proposed in his September 1992 address to Congress does not result in the same findings as did the look at traditional domestic missions. The proposed new missions tend to be full time and designed to capitalize on the characteristics of the military, not its skills. Discipline, high standards, intelligence, readiness, and responsiveness are what drive the desire to use the military for these missions. An example of this is the proposed youth training program.³³ This program seeks to capitalize on military role models who entered

the Army from the inner-city, or are a member of a disadvantaged minority. It is a utilization of military discipline, organization, and training skills to build good citizens who are proud of themselves and have a sense of discipline. The soldier's combat, mission essential skills are not used or enhanced in executing these missions. The fact that these missions are generally full time detracts from the primary responsibility of Army units, to keep combat skills and equipment readiness high. Full time military support also provides no incentive for the development of civilian programs to take over from the military. Finally, large amounts of time spent on non-METL efforts means readiness is undoubtedly degraded.

Care must be exercised, therefore, in accepting these missions, since they fail, for the most part, to use the mission essential skills of our soldiers. They instead replace a normal civilian role or function with the more disciplined, responsive soldier/military unit. The civilian community should draw lessons from military successes in individual development, education, and in building pride, confidence and maturity. They should employ these lessons to domestic problems. To directly employ the Army to offset normal civilian functions, however, is inappropriate.

Criteria for Other Than War Missions

There are some very valid concerns associated with other than war missions. First of all, they have the potential of becoming all consuming. Already the ideas for using the Army to fix domestic problems are overwhelming. Conditions in Africa, Southwest Asia, and the former Soviet Union present many potential humanitarian assistance missions for the United Nations and therefore the U.S. Put simply, these missions could easily occupy all our

resources.

This would clearly be an unacceptable situation. Focus on the Army's preparedness to execute its primary warfighting mission must not be lost. It is imperative, therefore, that criteria be established for evaluating other than war missions. Failure to screen missions in *this manner could result in distraction from primary missions, readiness failure when called to protect U.S. interests or defend the nation, and ultimately the loss of American lives.*

Forward presence missions in a theater of operations are evaluated by the Unified CINC. He determines their value in accomplishing his missions of maintaining stability, shaping events to best support interests and war plans, etc. He may also be called upon to make recommendations concerning major humanitarian or peacekeeping/making missions, such as Somalia and Bosnia. The now familiar "Weinberger Tests"³⁴ stand us in good stead in making these evaluations and should continue to be used.

Domestic support missions are not so clear to evaluate. Civil emergencies, whether natural disasters, civil disturbance, or civil defense are straight forward, in view of the necessity of quick response and the inherent short-term nature of the missions. Community assistance, however, encompasses a broad spectrum and has the biggest potential for misuse of the military. Units can easily become so engrossed in providing much needed, effective support to local communities that they fail to sustain acceptable combat readiness. Domestic support missions should only be accepted when:

1. They exercise METL skills and enhance individual and unit readiness.
2. They do not detract from training required to sustain combined arms readiness.
3. They have a clearly defined scope, including start and end points.

4. They are of short duration.
5. They do not compete with private sector or other government services.
6. They do not divert material or monetary resources required to sustain combat readiness.
7. They do not merely attempt to capitalize on military characteristics, such as responsiveness, discipline, confidence and maturity of soldiers, and pride.³⁵

Installation/regional military commanders are the key to this process. They must be firm in their resolve to maintain a trained and ready force while being receptive to missions which both support the civilian community and enhance readiness. Leaders face the challenge of sustaining this balance without slighting either side. The ability to do so is a "win-win" situation. Failure, however, represents at a minimum lost opportunity, and in the worst case, unpreparedness.

Attitude

Attitude has a great deal to do with the success each of us achieves as individuals. The same is true of the Army and individual units as they approach other than war missions.

If other than war missions are viewed by leaders as a hinderance, a distraction, or not their "real mission," the result may be successful, due to military pride of accomplishment, but the benefits of the mission to the unit will be degraded and soldiers will be left with a bitter taste for these missions as a result of poor leader example. The Army also loses the benefits of good publicity, which is avoided by leaders who don't want the missions again.³⁶

Similarly, the benefits of other than war missions are degraded when leaders fail to execute them in the same manner, and to the same standard, they will execute wartime missions. If units are to get full training value from other than war missions, and that should be the goal, they must follow the proven Army rule of "training as they will fight."

A positive attitude toward valid other than war missions can provide outstanding results. Quality support to a Unified CINC or a domestic agency, success, good training, soldier pride, and good publicity are realized. An example of this kind of productive mission was conducted recently by the 555th Combat Engineer Group and the 864th Combat Heavy Engineer Battalion. The Group was tasked to support Joint Task Force 6 drug interdiction operations in the Southwestern United States. Instead of treating this mission as another administrative, other than war mission, the Group and Battalion viewed it as an excellent training opportunity. Deployment of both the Group headquarters and the Battalion was conducted as an Emergency Readiness Deployment Exercise (EDRE), using rail and U.S. Air Force assets. The operation was conducted using a tactical, theater of war scenario. The Group evaluated the Battalion against Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) standards. The Battalion operated just as it would in a theater of operations: operations covered over 24,000 sq mi; companies operated over 160 mi from the battalion headquarters; all missions were METL based; and individual soldier survival skills were exercised and evaluated.

The result of the 555th/864th exercise was high morale, improved unit readiness, improved drug interdiction operations, and a clear recognition by military and civilian leaders who visited the area, that Army support of the right other than war missions can have a win-

win outcome. Similar success and benefits were reported by units who deployed to provide relief from Hurricane Andrew using their go to war contingency plans and configuration.³⁷

The Army's leaders need to project a positive attitude, and insist that subordinates have the same approach toward valid other than war missions. Attitude must be focused on maximizing the return on the opportunity, not on complaining about being assigned the mission. We become our own worst enemy when we fail to capitalize on opportunity and reflect a negative attitude to soldiers and the public.

FORCE STRUCTURE

The increasing probability, necessity, and utility of other than war missions make a closer look at their impact on the force structure process especially important. The ongoing downsizing of the force makes this investigation particularly critical.

The "above the line" force structure (major combat units) is determined during the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process based upon needed capabilities. The Department of Defense calls this force the "Base Force." As currently established, the base force is that force which can execute two major regional contingencies simultaneously.³⁸ This force is based solely on combat illustrative planing scenarios and the warfighting capability to execute war plans.

The Army, and the other services, take their portion of the "above the line" base force and develop the total force structure. The Army Planing, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) uses the Total Army Analysis (TAA) to evaluate requirements and determine the structure of "below the line" forces; those required to support the

major combat units.

The TAA process applies "allocation" and "existence" rules to determine the right numbers and types of combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units (Active and Reserve Component) to support the "above the line" major combat forces.³⁹ Allocation and existence rules are based on doctrine as well as annual updates of requirements to support a particular combat force in a specific theater. Interestingly, however, allocation and existence rules are based exclusively on warfighting criteria and information.⁴⁰ This, combined with an "above the line" force based solely on warfighting capability, results in an Army force structure that is designed only for its primary mission.


The TAA process is a thorough, comprehensive method of evaluating force structure against a desired capability and requirements. It served the nation very well when the world situation was defined by super power confrontation. The current process, however, gives no consideration to the demand for executing an ever increasing number of other than war missions.

Domestic missions support a state, or several states. It would, therefore, be logical to have the National Guard Bureau (NGB) submit input on domestic requirements for Army support. Currently, the NGB provides no input to the TAA process concerning requirements for execution of the domestic missions.⁴¹ Similarly, the TAA process considers nothing from the CINCs concerning theater requirements for other than war forward presence missions.⁴²

During the Cold War, where warfighting capability requirements drove the fielding a large force, ignoring the requirements of other than war missions was not critical. Forces

had the capacity and capability to execute both warfighting and peacetime engagement missions within the base force warfighting structure. Today, however, the force is over 25% smaller than it was at the height of the Cold War.

Pressure for cost savings, lack of a major threat and debate over the extent of regional threats to U.S. interests are going to result in further reductions in force structure. As the size of the force shrinks, at what point will warfighting capability not generate enough CS and CSS structure to support critical other than war missions such as, domestic disaster relief or humanitarian assistance? The figure shown below depicts the potential problem we could be facing now or in the near future.



At what point will the force structure developed by TAA result in combat forces having to do CS and CSS type domestic support missions because we don't have sufficient CS/CSS structure? (Point A on the curve) Have we reached that point in some aspects of force mix

and stationing? At what point will one major regional contingency and a major disaster or other, non-warfighting mission provide the proper definition of adequate force structure?

The answers are, we don't know! We don't know because we haven't quantified the requirements for other than war missions. In spite of the fact that they are absolutely necessary and critical aspects of the Army's domestic support to the nation's security, and that other than war forward presence missions are increasing in probability and importance in our regional security strategy, we do not know their impact on structure and warfighting capability.

There is a very real possibility that as we downsize the Army on the basis of required war fighting capability we could reach a point where the CS and/or CSS justified based on "allocation and existence rules" is less than required to execute other than war forward presence and domestic support missions. It may be necessary to "over-allocate" CS/CSS during periods of peace, based on mission requirements. Unfortunately, our present system of force structuring doesn't give us the information we need to make sound force structure decisions. We "hope" we have sufficient forces to meet the nation's other than war requirements. Hope is not a good plan!

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following actions need to be taken to bring current planning and programming systems in line with the realities of a changing world and declining defense resources.

1. Acknowledge the fact that other than war missions are necessary, supportive of national security strategy, and contribute to readiness if executed by the correct forces.

2. Require CINCs to determine resource requirements to execute other than war forward presence missions in their theater which support JSCP guidance to:

- show national commitment
- lend credibility to our alliances
- enhance regional stability
- shape events in our best interests
- provide a crisis response capability

3. Require the National Guard Bureau to determine resource requirements for military support to civil authorities.

4. Incorporate the input from recommendations 2 and 3 into the TAA process to insure the proper total force structure, as well as proper AC/RC mix and stationing are achieved. This may mean "over-allocating" CS/CSS units.

5. Senior leaders must positively emphasize the total utility of the force, not just its warfighting capability.

6. Military leaders must be a part of the solution, both in fact and perception. They can't continue to staunchly defend a force which is only structured and justified to meet part of the armed force's mission. Failure to change will result in Congress taking charge and telling us what size will fit the budget and what kind of forces they want in their districts.

7. Senior leadership needs to proactively pursue these recommendations so that the Army and JCS determine the right force size and configuration.

CONCLUSION

Today's military leadership and the civilian leaders of the Department of Defense are challenged, like so many of their distinguished predecessors have been, to provide vision in a

time of uncertainty. They seem clear and united on the position that the military remain strong and ready. Unfortunately, however, their prescription for doing that is focused solely on maintaining our warfighting capability. Scenarios for sizing the force are based entirely on capabilities to defeat regional threats. Threats that are now and will continue to be, highly debated. Analysis systems which determine the supporting structure for the combat forces consider only warfighting requirements. There is a reluctance on the part of our senior military leaders to acknowledge that the armed forces have valid, non-warfighting, national security enhancing missions. Drug interdiction, disaster recovery, and control of civil disturbance all contribute to a sound, secure nation which is respected by the world. Likewise, forward presence operations, such as, nation and humanitarian assistance sustain U.S. influence abroad and enhance security of our interests.

Avoidance of other than war missions by senior leaders is a multi-edged sword. The military is perceived as protective, wasteful, and largely unusable except in clearly defined, combat oriented situations. Congress is more than willing to cut both budget and force strength based on its own evaluation of the world threat, and probably has the support of the American public, since these "peace savings" can be spent on the domestic economy. The military's ability to execute its missions, both warfighting and other than war (domestic and forward presence), is degraded. The nation's security is placed at a higher risk and reduced U.S. influence around the world tends to promote rather than reduce instability.

Military leadership must accept the realities of a changing world and a domestic environment demanding attention. They must be proactive in shaping a force which can effectively accomplish all the missions that are necessary to insure the nation's security, both

domestically and internationally. This doesn't mean executing every mission which is proposed. It doesn't mean the priority of missions should be changed to place other than war missions first. Defense of the nation, and readiness of our warfighting capability, clearly remain the overriding priorities of our armed forces. Leaders must, however, stop denying other than war missions and enthusiastically support the execution of missions which enhance all aspects of national security, employ the combat specialty skills of our soldiers, and sustain a combat ready force during peacetime.

Although the results of a full analysis of warfighting and other than war mission requirements may result in the retention of more force structure than warfighting alone would justify, leaders must articulate clearly that this is not a last ditch effort to save units. It is not, as some have suggested, a "cash cow" the military is seizing hold of to save force structure. There must be a clear understanding by all concerned (military and civilian) that increased execution of valid other than war missions is a proper adjustment based on changed world and domestic environment. It is maximizing the utility of the force in order to insure it remains at the correct size and configuration to meet all the nation's security needs, and is kept combat ready, so that we have no more "Task Force Smiths." It is good leadership and professional service to the nation!

ENDNOTES

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³ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington: January 1993), p. i.

⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States, (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1992), 6.

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⁶ Department of the Army, Military Support to Civil Authorities (Draft), Field Manual 100-19 (Fort Monroe: Training and Doctrine Command, January 1993), p. 30-32.

⁷ Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, (Washington: January 1993), p. 22.

⁸ Ibid., p. v-ix.

⁹ Sam Nunn, "The Role of the Military in Disaster Relief," Congressional Record, Vol 138, No. 122, (September 10, 1992): S13303-4.

¹⁰ William W. Epley, Roles and Missions of the United States Army, (Washington: 1991), 11.

¹¹ Nunn, Congressional Record, p. S13300.

¹² George Bush, "In Defense of Defense" (Speech to the Aspen Institute Symposium - August 2, 1990), App E to Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and Congress, (Washington: January 1991).

¹³ Nunn, Congressional Record, p. S13300.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. S13303.

¹⁵ Soraya Nelson, "Humanitarian Relief May Soon Be Common for Military," Navy Times, 21 September 1992, p. 25.

¹⁶ Nunn, Congressional Record, p. S13301.

¹⁷ William Matthews, "Military Muscle to Shift to Humanitarian Help," Air Force Times, 6 January 1993, p. 14.

¹⁸ Les Aspin, "With Soviets and Cold War Gone, What is the Future for U.S. Forces?," Reserve Officers Association National Security Report, (November 1992): p. 24.

¹⁹ Harry Summers, "Humanitarian Missions Could Signal Collapse of 'Fighting Spirit'," The Army Times, 14 December 1992, p. 35.

²⁰ Seth Cropsey, "The Hard Truth About 'Soft' Missions," The Wall Street Journal, 19 January 1993, sec. A, p. 12.

²¹ Ibid.

²² William Matthews, "Critics Say Stay-at-Home Role Will Hamper Readiness," The Army Times, 26 October 1992, p. 24.

²³ T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: Bantam, 1991, c1963), 660.

²⁴ Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters, Vol XXII, No. 4 (Winter 1992-93): 14.

²⁵ Department of Defense, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), Directive Number 3025.1 (Washington: Department of Defense, 15 January 1993), p. 6.

²⁶ James R. Brannon, Trip Report, Center for Army Lessons Learned Fact Finding Team (Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki), Fort Leonard Wood, MO, 27 October 1992, p. 4.

²⁷ Department of the Army, Training the Force, Field Manual 25-100 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, November 1988), 2-1.

²⁸ Transcript, National Defense University Symposium, "Military Support of Civil Authorities at Home and Abroad", Washington, D.C., 1-2 December 1992.

²⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "1992 Joint Military Net Assessment," Washington, D.C., 21 August 1992, p. 1-4.

³⁰ Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Forward Presence Operations," Briefing Slides, Washington, January 1993.

³¹ National Security Strategy, p. 8.

³² Michael Vernon, Plans Officer, J-5, Joint Chiefs of Staff, telephone interview by author, 5 February 1993.

³³ Nunn, Congressional Record, p. S13303.

³⁴ Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting For Peace, (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 402.

³⁵ These criteria are a combination of those proposed by Senator Nunn in his June 1992 speech to Congress, those outlined in FM 100-19 (Draft), and the author's experience and review.

³⁶ Robert J. Greenwalt Jr., Report to the Commandant--Hurricane Andrew Relief Operations, Fort Riley, KS: 18 October 1992, p. 6.

³⁷ Greenwalt, p. 2.

³⁸ Secretary of Defense, Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999, (SECRET) Washington: 22 May 1992, p. 22.

³⁹ Joe A. Fortner, "Force Structuring For Combat Service Support," Army Logistician, January-February 1989, p. 13.

⁴⁰ Craig Scott, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army, Force Development, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 18 January 1993.

⁴¹ Mike Hersey, Force Structure Division, National Guard Bureau, telephone interview by author, 3 February 1993.

⁴² Vernon, interview by author.

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